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HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION UNDER THE 
ALIEN TORT STATUTE: IS THE FORTI v. 
SUAREZ-MASON DECISION THE LAST OF ITS 
KIND? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 18, 1977, at Ezeiza International Airport in Bue-
nos Aires, Argentina, military authorities of the Argentine First 
Army Corps seized Alfredo Forti, his mother and four brothers for 
alleged crimes of subversion. The army officials also confiscated all 
of the family's belongings, including several thousand dollars in 
cash. After six days of detention, authorities blindfolded the five 
brothers, aged eight to sixteen, and released them on a street in the 
capital city. Their mother, Nelida Azucena Sosa de Forti, is still 
missing. I 
On July 25, 1977, plainclothes policemen of the Argentine First 
Army Corps seized Debora Benchoam, her brother and over 
$20,000 in valuables from the Benchoams' home in Buenos Aires. 
The officials detained Debora incommunicado for one month and 
then imprisoned her without charge for over four years. They 
released her brother the day following his abduction, but he died 
shortly thereafter of bullet wounds allegedly inflicted by army of-
ficials during his detention. The Benchoam family'S assets were 
never returned. 2 
Upon their release from captivity, these victims of the Argen-
tine military junta's "dirty war"3 fled for safety to the United States. 
Once there, Forti and Benchoam joined together in January 1987 
to bring an action in federal district court against General Suarez-
Mason, the former Commander of the First Army Corps. Forti and 
I Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
2 Id. 
3 The "dirty war" in Argentina, occurring during the second half of the 1970s, was a 
military campaign designed to purge the country of suspected subversive activity. In 1975, 
the constitutional government of President Peron declared a "state of siege" under an article 
of the Argentine Constitution and assigned the responsibility of suppressing terrorism to the 
Argentine Armed Forces. In March 1976, the Armed Forces staged a successful coup d'etat 
and replaced President Peron with a military junta. The junta increased its attack on sub-
version and by 1979, the military had detained without charge tens of thousands of civilians 
or alleged subversives. Over 12,000 persons were "disappeared" or "nunca mas." See generally 
Human Rights in the World: Argentina, 31 INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS REV. 1 (1983). 
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Benchoam sought compensatory and punitive damages for eleven 
violations of customary international law and laws of the United 
States and Argentina.4 Both plaintiffs alleged claims of torture; 
prolonged arbitrary detention without trial; cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment; false imprisonment; assault and battery; in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress; and conversion. Separately, 
Forti asserted a claim for "causing the disappearance" of his mother, 
and Benchoam asserted claims for the summary execution of her 
brother, wrongful death and a survival action.s The plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendant ordered Argentine military personnel di-
rectly under his control to commit all of the above acts. 6 
Forti and Benchoam sought relief under the Alien Tort Stat-
ute. 7 This section of the United States Code grants original juris-
diction over suits brought by aliens for torts "committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."8 In Forti v. 
Suarez-Mason, despite the defendant's contentions to the contrary, 
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California 
held that it had jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims under Section 
1350.9 Furthermore, the court refused to apply several procedural 
limitations asserted by General Suarez-Mason which would have 
precluded adjudication of the suit. IO 
The Forti case never reached the appeals stage. On April 27, 
1988, Judge Jensen granted Argentina's request for extradition of 
4 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538. The plaintiffs requested compensatory damages of $10 
million, punitive and exemplary damages of $10 million and reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. First Amended Complaint at 29, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 
1987) (No. C-87-2058-DLJ). 
5 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538. A survival action is a cause of action vested in a deceased 
person which survives his or her death and which is brought by the personal representative 
of the decedent. See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Request for Stay 
at 46-47, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (No. C-87-2058-DLJ). 
6 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538. Two other civil actions have been brought against the 
General for similar offenses: Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, C-87-2057SC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
12, 1988); de Rapaport v. Suarez-Mason, C-87-2266JPV (N.D. Cal. filed May 6, 1987). See 
Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1536 n.3. 
7 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) [hereinafter Alien Tort Statute or Section 1350]. The Alien 
Tort Statute states: "[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by 
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States." 
8 Id. 
9 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1544. General Suarez-Mason raised only the issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction. He never contested the issue of personal jurisdiction, thereby waiving 
any defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1536 n.3. 
10 Id. at 1552. General Suarez-Mason argued that the act of state doctrine, an Argentine 
statute of limitations and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (regarding indispensable parties) 
each bar adjudication of plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 1538. 
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the defendant. 11 Prior to his extradition, however, General Suarez-
Mason managed to bury his assets so that he has become essentially 
judgment proof. 12 Consequently, the district court entered a default 
judgment against the defendant pursuant to plaintiffs' motion. 13 
Not surprisingly, Suarez-Mason has failed to answer and thus, the 
case remains open until the court can hear an appeal to close it. 14 
A determination of damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs has not 
yet occurred. 
The decision in Forti furthered a recently developed and often 
debated construction of the Alien Tort Statute that permits foreign 
nationals to seek justice from other foreign nationals in American 
courts for international human rights violations. Yet, the Forti de-
cision revealed that federal jurisdiction in this area may be attacked 
on many fronts, especially by means of threshold limitations. Forti 
thus brought to light that litigation under the Alien Tort Statute 
may no longer be an effective means of providing a remedy to 
plaintiffs. 
This Note examines the significance that Forti v. Suarez-Mason 
and similar cases will have on future human rights litigation in the 
United States. Part Two discusses the Forti court's use of both the 
legislative history of the Alien Tort Statute and the subsequent 
judicial construction of its provisions. Part Three examines the Forti 
court's treatment of various threshold matters which, if applied, 
limit broad use of the Alien Tort Statute. Part Four identifies and 
analyzes related issues not raised in Forti but which affect the po-
tential significance of Forti on human rights case law. Finally, Part 
Five examines whether, in light of the current obstacles of a con-
servative judiciary and the problem of enforcing judgments, the 
Forti decision furthered the possibility of effective international hu-
man rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. 
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
In Forti, the district court first addressed the question of federal 
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. The court sought to de-
11 In the Matter of the Requested Extradition of Carlos Guillermo Suarez-Mason, 694 
F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Cal. 1988). The court based extradition on alleged multiple counts of 
murder, false imprisonment and forging a passport. [d. 
12 Telephone interview with Kathleen Comfort, clerk for Judge Jensen of the Federal 
District Court of the Northern District of California (Apr. 6, 1989). 
13 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, C-87-2058-DLJ Order (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1988). 
14 Telephone interview, supra note 12. 
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termine whether Section 1350 designated federal district court as 
the proper forum for claims of the sort brought by the plaintiffs. 
The court also examined whether the Alien Tort Statute conferred 
a private cause of action on the plaintiffs and whether all of the 
alleged "international torts" in the plaintiffs' complaint fell within 
the Alien Tort Statute's jurisdiction. IS To assist in this determina-
tion, Judge Jensen examined the history behind the Alien Tort 
Statute and subsequent interpretation of its provisions. 16 
A. Provision of a Forum 
The Alien Tort Statute provides federal district courts with 
jurisdiction to hear civil tort claims of violations of United States 
treaty law or the law of nationsY The Alien Tort Statute originated 
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 completed by the First Con-
gress. 18 Interestingly, no claims were brought under the Alien Tort 
Statute for nearly 200 years. Then, in 1980, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived this original legislation 
in Filartiga v. Pefia-lrala l9 by deciding that a federal district court 
may exercise jurisdiction over an alien tort claim.20 
Filartiga was a wrongful death action brought in the United 
States by a Paraguayan doctor and his daughter, residing in the 
United States, against Pefta-Irala, an Inspector General of Police in 
Asuncion Paraguay.21 The Filartigas alleged that Pefta-Irala tor-
tured to death Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son, J oelito, during 
the military regime's "state of siege" as punishment for the doctor's 
anti-governmental political activities. After the military regime col-
lapsed, Pefta-Irala fled to the United States whereupon the Filartigas 
served him with a summons and civil complaint. 22 The district court 
dismissed the Filartigas' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 23 On appeal, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Kauf-
15 See Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538-44. 
16 [d. at 1539. 
17 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
18 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 9(b), I Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789). The Judiciary Act 
provided the district courts with "cognizance concurrent with the courts of the several States, 
or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 
19 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
20 [d. at 887. 
21 [d. at 878. 
22 [d. at 878-79. 
23 [d. at 880; 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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man, reversed the lower court and held that federal jurisdiction 
existed under Section 1350 since "deliberate torture perpetrated 
under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms 
of international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality 
of the parties. "24 
The circuit court in Filartiga grounded its decision in the history 
behind the enactment of Section 1350 as it originally appeared in 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.25 Although critics of this broad interpre-
tation of the Alien Tort Statute pointed to the lack of legislative 
history behind Section 1350,26 Judge Kaufman neutralized their 
criticism by illuminating the principle that prevailed in both the 
political writings of the time and in the scant but existent legislative 
history of the Alien Tort Statute. Judge Kaufman deduced that the 
Framers intended that matters of international law bearing on the 
national interest should be justiciable in the federal court system.27 
The Framers believed that the federal courts would be better able 
than state courts to promote the young nation's position among 
other existing nations by treating questions of international law 
consistently.28 
Furthermore, legal scholars have reasoned that the Framers 
believed denying an alien a judicial forum was an offense against 
the foreigner's state that might very well provoke warfare.29 The 
Framers recognized that a foreign nation could hold the young 
United States accountable for any action by an American which 
harmed the other nation's citizen.3o Thus, the Framers' desire to 
avoid international conflict inspired them to authorize United States 
24 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
25 Id. at 887. 
26 In lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), Judge Friendly stated, 
"This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us 
since the First Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know [from] whence it came." See also 
D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 
(1988); Randall, FederalJurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien Tort 
Statute, pt. I, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. I (1985). 
27 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887. 
28 Id. Judge Kaufman quoted John jay's words in THE FEDERALIST No.3 (J. Jay): 
"Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, 
will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner, whereas adjudi-
cations on the same points and questions in the thirteen states will not always accord or be 
consistent." 630 F.2d at 887. Alexander Hamilton supported jay's position in the following 
statement: "[Federal court jurisdiction] is not less essential to the preservation of the public 
faith than to the security of the public tranquillity." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (A. 
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
29 See, e.g., Randall, supra note 26, at 20-22. 
30 Id. at 21. 
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courts to grant aliens domestic civil remedies for torts committed 
in violation of the law of nations.31 Again, the Drafters intended 
that this jurisdictional grant should only adhere to federal courts 
because they were far less likely than state courts to be biased against 
foreigners32 or to create inconsistent case law. 33 
In accordance with this interpretation of the Framers' intent, 
Judge Kaufman found federal subject matter jurisdiction under 
Section 1350 in Filartiga for wrongful death by torture. 34 Since the 
Filartiga decision in 1980, numerous other federal courts have sub-
scribed to Judge Kaufman's interpretation of the jurisdictional 
grant and the history behind it. 35 Today, a general consensus sup-
ports federal jurisdiction over alien claims arising under Section 
1350.36 After discussing Judge Kaufman's interpretation and the 
31 Alexander Hamilton argued that urals the denial or perversion of justice by the 
sentences of the courts ... is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it will follow 
that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other 
countries are concerned. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 476 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
32 The Framers attributed this bias against foreigners to the more parochial nature of 
state courts as compared to federal courts. Randall, supra note 26, at 21. See generally THE 
FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton). 
33 State courts still have jurisdiction to hear aliens' claims under transitory tort theory. 
This theory provides the state courts with subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of 
individuals when the court also has personal jurisdiction. Judge Kaufman gives a more 
detailed discussion of this theory in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. See also D'Amato, supra note 
26, at 62-66. 
34 630 F.2d at 887. 
35 Although most federal courts adhere to Judge Kaufman's construction of the Alien 
Tort Statute, federal courts have exercised jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute in only 
five cases since Filartiga: Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. C-87-2057-SC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 
12, 1988) (granting jurisdiction over causes of action for torture, arbitrary detention as torts 
in violation of laws of nation); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(exercising jurisdiction over claims of torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, summary ex-
ecution); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985) 
(granting jurisdiction over Soviet Union's seizure and detention of a Swedish diplomat in 
1945 in violation of the law of nations); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 
857 (D. Md. 1961) (taking jurisdiction over child custody suit where aliens transporting child 
with forged passport violates international law); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 
1795) (granting jurisdiction over seizure of prize slave ship as a tort committed in violation 
of law of nations). 
36 Exceptions to a finding of a jurisdictional grant have been largely due to factual 
distinctions or an implementation of procedural limitations. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping 
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 
1987), rev'd 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act preempts Alien Tort 
Statute's jurisdictional grant); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), 
aII'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Congressmen's claims of deprivation of right to partic-
ipate in President's decision regarding funding of Nicaraguan Contras is nonjusticiable 
political question); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aII'd 
per curiam 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (international 
terrorist acts committed by non-state actors such as the PLO are not universally recognized 
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consensus of courts supporting it,Judge Jensen in Forti correspond-
ingly recognized that subject matter jurisdiction existed over the 
particular claims of the plaintiffs, Forti and Benchoam.37 
B. Provision of a Private Cause of Action 
After finding jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute in Forti, 
Judge Jensen turned to the issue of whether Section 1350 encom-
passes a private cause of action. Again, he examined and relied on 
case law precedent, especially Filartiga. The Second Circuit in Filar-
tiga held that the plaintiffs had a private right of action under 
Section 1350.38 The Filartiga court reasoned that plaintiffs can es-
tablish a private cause of action under Section 1350 simply by 
showing that the alleged tort violated an United States treaty or the 
law of nations. 39 Because Judge Kaufman found that torture by a 
state official violated the law of nations, he held that plaintiffs had 
asserted an actionable tort under the Alien Tort Statute.40 
Unlike his extensive treatment of the forum question, however, 
Judge Kaufman failed to articulate clearly his finding of a private 
cause of action. Rather, he simply inferred that a private cause of 
action existed within the scope of Section 1350.41 Subsequent judi-
violations of the law of nations); Jones v. Petty Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 
343 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (plaintiff did not qualify as "alien" under the Alien Tort Statute, and 
Republic of Sudan's failure to warn decedent of imminent political danger, failure to provide 
police protection and failure to observe decedent's human rights were not violations of the 
law of nations); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (violation of first 
amendment right of free speech does not constitute violation of law of nations; act of state 
precludes adjudication); Trajano v. Marcos, Civil No. 86-0207, slip op. (D. Haw. 1986) (case 
involving torture committed by foreign head of state is non justiciable under act of state 
doctrine); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (suit against Nazi war 
criminal for human rights violations in wartime Yugoslavia was time barred); Siderman de 
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT, slip op. (C.D. Cal. 1984), vacated and 
dismissed, order (C.D. Cal. 1985) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act preempts § 1350 juris-
diction over claim against nation for torture). 
37 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538. 
38 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. 
39 [d. at 880. The law of nations is defined as: "The law which regulates the relationships 
of nations to each other .... Its sources are customs and usages, treatise, and the decisions 
of such tribunals as the International Court of Justice and the International Court of Human 
Rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (Abr. 5th ed. 1983). 
40 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. The Second Circuit recognized that the law of nations is a 
fluid, developing body of law. Judge Kaufman stated, "[Clourts must interpret international 
law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world 
today." 630 F.2d at 881. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
41 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88. Judge Kaufman inferred a private cause of action 
from the plain meaning of the Alien Tort Statute. [d. He noted that in previous Alien Tort 
Statute cases, courts have had trouble finding a cause of action, but this is attributable to the 
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cial decisions and legal scholarly works have assailed Judge Kauf-
man's inference as unsupportable and beyond the constitutional 
limits of acceptable judicial reasoning.42 Consequently, a concordant 
interpretation of the cause of action question was slow to emerge 
and does not yet rest on solid ground. 
The controversy following the Filartiga decision clearly mani-
fests itself in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, a 1984 three-judge 
panel decision of the D.C. Circuit.43 In this case, the survivors and 
relatives of victims of a 1978 armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel 
brought suit in federal district court for compensatory and punitive 
damages against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
Libya, and other Arab groupS.44 The plaintiffs relied on the Alien 
Tort Statute to establish subject matter jurisdiction and a private 
cause of action because the alleged torts violated the law of nations, 
United States treaties, criminal laws and the common law. The 
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the plaintiffs' 
contentions and dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. 45 
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia affirmed the dismissal but could not agree on a rationale 
for doing SO.46 Three distinct opinions resulted from the panel 
decision. In the lead opinion, Judge Edwards embraced the prin-
ciples espoused in Filartiga, but endorsed the dismissal of Tel-Oren 
because of factual distinctions between the two cases.47 Judge Ed-
wards agreed that the Alien Tort Statute requires nothing more 
than a violation of the law of nations to establish a cause of action.48 
He argued, however, that the law of nations neither encompasses 
acts of international terrorism as it does official acts of torture nor 
imposes "the same responsibility or liability on non-state actors, such 
as the PLO, as it does on states and persons acting under color of 
state law" such as the defendant in Filartiga.49 Hence, Judge Ed-
fact that these cases did not involve universally recognized norms necessary to establish a 
violation of the law of nations. Id. 
42 See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 798-823 (Bork, j., concur-
ring); Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the 
Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REv. 467 (1986); Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals 
"Violate" International Law, 21 VAND. j. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988). 
43 726 F.2d 774, 775. 
44 Id. at 775. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776. 
48 Id. at 779. 
49 Id. at 776. 
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wards believed that although the Alien Tort Statute may provide 
both a forum and a cause of action, it did not in this particular case 
because of significant factual differences.5o 
Judge Robb, by contrast, did not address the applicability or 
construction of the Alien Tort Statute. Rather, he found that be-
cause the dispute in Tel-Oren involved international political terror-
ism, the case was a "non justiciable" political question.51 He stated 
that "the courts must be careful to preserve [the President's] flexi-
bility and must hesitate to publicize and perhaps legitimize that 
which ought to remain hidden and those who deserve the brand of 
absolute illegitimacy."52 Judge Robb seriously questioned the judi-
ciary's role in cases of this sort. He believed that to exercise juris-
diction over plaintiffs' claims would, at the very least, exceed the 
role of the court, as delimited by the constitutional separation of 
powers. 53 At worst, Judge Robb wrote, such jurisdiction could result 
in irreparable injuries to the national interest. 54 
Judge Bork stated that Section 1350 is nothing more than a 
jurisdictional grant and does not create a private cause of action.55 
Unlike Judge Robb, he believed that the court must confront the 
issues concerning the Alien Tort Statute. He did not, however, agree 
with Judge Edwards' use of the Filartiga approach to respond to 
these questions. Judge Bork maintained that plaintiffs seeking to 
invoke Section 1350 must demonstrate a private cause of action 
arising under either a treaty of the United States or the law of 
nations.56 
Treaties of the United States, however, generally do not confer 
privately enforceable rights. Only when a treaty is self-executing 
can an individual enforce its provisions in court.57 Judge Bork ex-
amined the five treaties on which the plaintiffs relied 58 and found 
50 Id. 
51 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823. Judge Robb declared that "[fJederal courts are not in the 
position to determine the international status of terrorist acts." Id. 
52 Id. at 825. 
53 Id. at 823; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
54 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826-27. 
55 Id. at 810. 
56 Id. at 820. 
57 Id. at 808. A treaty is self-executing when it explicitly or impliedly grants a private 
cause of action. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 
F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
58 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808. After referring to a U.S. Department of State document 
entitled Treaties in Force, Judge Bork found that only five out of the thirteen treaties alleged 
by the plaintiffs in Tel-Oren are binding on the United States. Id. 
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that none grant a private cause of action, either explicitly or im-
pliedly.59 He thus ruled that plaintiffs had failed to assert a cause 
of action for torts committed in violation of an United States treaty.60 
Similarly, Judge Bork rejected Judge Edwards' reasoning that 
a private cause of action for torts in violation of the law of nations 
is implicit in the Alien Tort Statute.61 This proposition, Judge Bork 
argued, clearly contradicts the original intent of the Drafters and 
the constitutional role of courts in matters of foreign relations. 
Nevertheless, Judge Bork conceded that the broadest reading ar-
guably could lead to this construction.62 
Even under a broad reading, Judge Bork believed that the 
Alien Tort Statute would confer jurisdiction only over the three 
international crimes recognized at the time of the enactment of the 
Judiciary Act in 1789: piracy, offenses to ambassadors and violations 
of safe-conduct.63 Judge Bork feared that to extend jurisdiction 
beyond these three tortious acts so as to include the terrorist acts 
in Tel-Oren "would be far more likely to exacerbate tensions with 
other nations than to promote peaceful relations" as the Framers 
had intended.64 Hence, he advised the judiciary to await a modern 
legislative act or an executive agreement that explicitly provides a 
private cause of action before expanding the scope of international 
torts. Any expansion otherwise, he warned, would be poorly sup-
ported by either the Alien Tort Statute or international norms which 
themselves do not contemplate private enforcement.65 
Judge Edwards criticized Judge Bork's interpretation of the 
cause of action aspect of Section 1350.66 Judge Edwards reasoned 
that requiring plaintiffs to find a right to sue in the law of nations 
59 Id. at 810. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 811-12. 
62 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 811-12. When enacting the Alien Tort Statute, Judge Bork 
asserted that the Framers could not have contemplated cases like Filartiga and Tel-Oren 
because no international law of human rights existed in 1789. Id. at 813. Even assuming the 
Framers intended the law of nations to be a fluid, evolving concept, Judge Bork wrote that 
the Alien Tort Statute can never be a sanction for federal court policing of actions committed 
by foreign officials against their own citizens in their own countries. Id. According to Judge 
Bork, such a construction would actually provoke conflict, rather than avoid it as the Framers 
intended.Id. at 812. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton). 
63 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813-16. Judge Bork deduced that jurisdiction must be limited 
to these three offenses because no congressional mandate exists which specifically enumerates 
the torts over which federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1350. Id. 
64 Id. at 816. 
65 Id. 
66 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777-82. 
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is contrary to the plain, unequivocal language of Section 1350, 
legislative history and relevant precedent.67 Judge Edwards re-
marked: 
Unlike section 1331, which requires that an action "arise under" 
the laws of the United States,68 section 1350 does not require 
that the action "arise under" the law of nations, but only man-
dates a "violation of the law of nations" in order to create a 
cause of action. The language of the statute is explicit on this 
issue: by its express terms, nothing more than a violation of the 
law of nations is required to invoke section 1350.69 
Judge Bork's construction of an "arising under" requirement,Judge 
Edwards asserted, would reduce the Alien Tort Statute to a mere 
duplication of Section 1331.70 Judge Edwards refused to accept the 
proposition that Congress would retain and recodify a redundant 
jurisdictional statute and thus, he rejected Judge Bork's analysis. 71 
The opinions of Judge Edwards and Judge Bork represent the poles 
of the continuing dispute as to whether the Alien Tort Statute 
creates a private cause of action. 
Judge Jensen confronted these conflicting constructions of Sec-
tion 1350 in Forti.72 After weighing the merits of both analyses, he 
declined to adopt that of Judge Bork. Like Judge Edwards, Judge 
Jensen disagreed with Judge Bork's contention that a plaintiff must 
establish an independent cause of action in international law to 
67 [d. at 778. 
68 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) refers to the Federal Question Statute which provides that 
"the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
69 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (emphasis in original). 
70 [d. at 778. Alternatively, many plaintiffs allege independent jurisdiction under federal 
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See supra note 68. Federal question jurisdiction allows 
jurisdiction over claims which "arise under" treaties and laws of the United States. In Mar-
tinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. C-87-2057-SC, the federal district court held that the plain-
tiff had a cause of action in federal court directly under § 1331 for acts of torture and 
prolonged arbitrary detention. The majority of courts, however, find that unless the plaintiff 
can point to a specific or implied remedy granted by the law of nations, he or she cannot 
invoke § 1331 independently of § 1350. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779-80 n.4 (Edwards, J., 
concurring); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 279-80 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
71 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 777. Federal question jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that 
an "arising under" requirement can be ascribed to the Alien Tort Statute. [d. at 779. Although 
Congress enacted § 1350 prior to § 1331, it retained the Alien Tort Statute long after § 1331 
had become well-established. The retention of the Alien Tort Statute implies that Congress 
did not intend § 1331 to render § 1350 redundant. [d. 
72 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539. General Suarez-Mason urged the court to follow Judge 
Bork's construction of the Alien Tort Statute. Alternatively, Forti and Benchoam asked that 
the court mirror the Filartiga interpretation which Judge Edwards supported in Tel-Oren. See 
672 F. Supp. at 1539. 
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invoke Section 1350 jurisdiction. 73 Judge Jensen reasoned that such 
a requirement would negate the entire Section 1350 jurisdictional 
grant over alien tort claims involving customary international law 
"since the law of nations clearly does not create or define civil actions 
.... "74 Judge Jensen stated that a more logical approach and one 
which better reflects modern principles of international law is the 
analysis which Judge Kaufman proffered in Filartiga and Judge 
Edwards espoused in Tel-Oren. 75 Judge Jensen thus held that the 
Alien Tort Statute confers jurisdiction over alien tort claims on 
federal district courts and creates a private cause of action for alien 
plaintiffs. 76 Moreover, Judge Jensen wrote, Section 1350 requires 
only that a plaintiff plead a tort in violation of the law of nations 
in order to invoke a cause of action under Section 1350.77 
Judge Jensen recognized that a growing consensus supported 
this holding. 78 This consensus consists of other federal judges and 
numerous legal scholars79 who have criticized both Judge Bork's 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540. The court also found that it could exercise jurisdiction 
under § 1331. See supra note 70. Adopting the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Forti court held that claims which 
arise under the law of nations also arise under the laws of the United States since federal 
common law includes international law. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1544. 
77 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539. At this point in the litigation, General Suarez-Mason, 
relying on dictum in Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 
429 U.S. 835 (1976), argued that the law of nations extends only to relations between 
sovereign states. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540. Judge Jensen noted that the Second Circuit 
later rejected this dictum in Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884, by holding that the law of nations 
included the law of individual human rights. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540. Suarez-Mason also 
contended that plaintiffs must establish that every alleged tort claim constitutes an interna-
tional tort in order to support jurisdiction under § 1350. Id. Judge Jensen held that federal 
jurisdiction only requires the pleading of one such claim; pendent and ancillary jurisdiction 
cover the other claims. Id. Accordingly, the court rejected these contentions of the defendant. 
Id. 
78 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539. To illustrate this accord within the federal court system, 
Judge Jensen cited three additional precedents: Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 
No. CV82-1772-RMT, slip op. (C.D. Cal. 1984), vacated and dismissed on other grounds, order 
(C.D. Cal. 1985); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 
1985); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
79 In addition to the cases that Judge Jensen cited in Forti, several other courts have 
adopted the Filartiga position. See supra notes 35-36. Many legal scholars, moreover, have 
supported the Filartiga reasoning. See e.g., Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pe.iia-Irala, 22 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 
CINN. L. REV. 367 (1985); Randall, Further Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommen-
dation, pt. 2, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473 (1986); Schneebaum, The Enforceability of 
Customary Norms of International Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289 (1982). 
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interpretation of Section 1350 and Judge Robb's application of the 
political question doctrine to the Section 1350 claim in Tel-Oren. 
The consensus embraces the Filartiga position, thereby reinforcing 
this significant precedent for human rights litigation in United 
States courts. 
C. Defining a Violation of the Law of Nations 
The Forti court then addressed General Suarez-Mason's con-
tention that even if Section 1350 provided jurisdiction and a private 
cause of action, not all of the torts alleged were violations of the 
law of nations.80 Generally, a federal court will deny relief to a 
plaintiff who brings a claim under Section 1350 for an alleged 
offense which is not a violation of customary international law.8l 
Judge Jensen found, however, that courts may have difficulties 
ascertaining which torts qualify as violations of the law of nations.82 
Initially, when confronting this particular issue, federal courts 
relied on various international documents which codify customary 
international law in order to determine what constitutes an inter-
national tort for purposes of Section 1350.83 These documents, 
however, were not conclusive because they contained ideal princi-
ples beyond fundamental rights. Courts thus had the arduous task 
of classifying alleged violations as either established law or as mere 
aspirations. Jurisdiction could be exercised only over the former 
category.84 
To assist them in this classification process, courts turned to a 
judicially-created standard, commonly referred to as the Lopes/lIT 
80 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539-40. 
81 See supra note 36. 
82 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540. 
83 See, e.g., U. N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217(111), 3 U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI)A, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966); American Convention 
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. K/ 
XV III I. I. 
84 Despite the difficulties involved with ascertaining the law of nations and application 
of standards, most courts continue to employ the classification method. A minority view 
proposes an alternative method of using municipal law as the standard of liability. Randall, 
supra note 26, at 36-38. This approach sees the Alien Tort Statute as a forum-shifting statute 
where a cause of action for tort arises under municipal law, thereby providing fhe substantive 
standard for liability just as in an ordinary transitory tort action. [d. If a plaintiff can assert 
that the tort is also a violation of international law, the suit would shift into federal court. [d. 
Thus, the plaintiff must allege conduct which is both a tort under domestic law and a violation 
of the law of nations. See also Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (1961). 
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rule.85 This rule states that "a violation of the law of nations arises 
only when there has been a 'violation by one or more individuals 
of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship 
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) 
used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter 
se."'86 Through application of this standard, courts have determined 
that torts in violation of the law of nations are fundamental rights 
which are definable, obligatory, and universally condemned and 
which are reflected in international accords.87 
The Forti court applied the "definable, obligatory and univer-
sally condemned" standard when examining whether the plaintiffs' 
allegations of international tort violations were cognizable under 
the Alien Tort Statute.88 Judge Jensen emphasized the requirement 
85 lIT v. Vencap. Ltd .• 519 F.2d 1001. 10 15 (2d Cir. 1975). 
86 [d. (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder. 225 F. Supp. 292. 297 (E.D. Pa. 
1963) (emphasis in original)). 
87 On the question of violations of customary international law. Judge Kaufman reasoned 
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: "It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that 
the wrong is of mutual. and not merely several. concern. by means of express international 
accords. that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the 
meaning of [§ 1350)." 630 F.2d 876. 888 (2d Cir. 1980). Some torts clearly meet the Lopes/ 
IIT standard. including: 
(a) genocide. 
(b) slavery or slave trade. 
(c) the murder or causing disappearance of individuals. 
(d) torture or other cruel. inhuman. or degrading treatment or punishment. 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention. 
(f) systematic racial discrimination. or 
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights. 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW). Condemnation of these of-
fenses is deeply rooted in international custom and unequivocally codified in many interna-
tional agreements. Thus. courts generally recognize these offenses as violations of customary 
international law for Alien Tort Statute purposes. 
In the same respect. courts have used the Lopes/IIT standard to exclude certain tortious 
acts from the scope of § 1350. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 726 F.2d 774. 795-96 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (court held that the lack of a pronounced consensus precluded a terrorist 
act from rising to the level of an international tort); see also Guinto v. Marcos. 654 F. Supp. 
276 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (court held that a violation of first amendment right to free speech does 
not constitute a violation of the law of nations). 
88 Forti. 672 F. Supp. at 1539-40. Although the plaintiffs in Forti raised eleven causes 
of action. the court addressed only the alleged international human rights violations in its 
opinion. See id. at 1540-43. The Forti court did not discuss the state law claims of false 
imprisonment. assault and battery. intentional infliction of emotional distress. conversion and 
wrongful death because. if the court could exercise jurisdiction over any of the international 
law claims. principles of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction would provide jurisdiction over 
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of universality which represents "the willingness of nations to be 
bound by the particular legal principle, and so can justify the court's 
exercise of jurisdiction over the international tort claim."89 Conse-
quently, the court ruled that it had Section 1350 jurisdiction over 
claims that state officials were responsible for acts of torture,90 pro-
longed arbitrary detention91 and summary execution.92 The court 
found a consensus that these acts are international torts by reference 
to international custom, international accords and prior judicial 
decisions.93 The court concluded that each of the above allegations 
is precisely definable, substantially obligatory and unequivocally 
proscribed by the law of nations, thereby validating any exercise of 
jurisdiction over these claims.94 
Employing this same standard, the Forti court dismissed the 
claim of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.95 The court held 
that this claim did not meet the international tort standard because 
it lacked universal condemnation and definition.96 Accordingly, the 
the state law claims. Id. With respect to plaintiff Benchoam's survival claim on behalf of her 
deceased brother, the Forti court dismissed it with prejudice pursuant to General Suarez-
Mason's request and after Benchoam admitted that she would not be able to maintain this 
claim. /d. at 1552. 
89 Id. at 1540. 
90 Id. at 1541. Due to the grave nature of the plaintiffs' claims of official torture, the 
court held Forti and Benchoam should precisely state the acts upon which they predicated 
their claim. Id. The court treated Suarez-Mason's motion to dismiss as a motion for a more 
definite statement under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), (e) and hence ordered the plaintiffs to 
amend this portion of their complaint accordingly. Id. 
91 With respect to the claims of prolonged arbitrary detention, the Forti court pointed 
to a consensus found in United States case law, primarily Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 
505 F. Supp. 787, 795-98 (D. Kan. 1980). Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541. Moreover, the court 
found that this consensus is much stronger where a state arbitrarily detains its own citizens. 
Id. 
92 With respect to the claim of summary execution, the court noted that several inter-
national documents and several cases in dicta proscribe summary execution, including Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. 
Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986). Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1542. Thus, the court held this international 
tort is universal, definable and obligatory. Id . 
•• Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42. 
94 Id. Judge Jensen concluded that each claim must be supported by international law 
existing at the time of the alleged violations. Id. at 1539 n.5. 
95 Id. at 1543. Interestingly, the court's discussion of the plaintiffs' claim of cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment was brief. Similarly, its reasons for dismissing the claim 
were scant. See id. 
96 Id. Judge Jensen stated that U[b ]ecause this right lacks readily ascertainable parameters, 
it is unclear what behavior falls within the proscription-beyond such obvious torts as are 
already encompassed by the proscriptions of torture, summary execution and prolonged 
arbitrary detention." Id. 
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court held that a cause of action for cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
under Section 1350.97 
Similarly, the Forti court initially dismissed Forti's claim of 
"causing disappearance."98 The court held that while many nations 
condemn "causing disappearance," these nations by no means rep-
resent an universal consensus. Rather, Judge Jensen noted, a lack 
of agreement exists in the international community as to the ele-
ments needed for this claim.99 Thus, the court found that "causing 
disappearance" did not rise to the level of being a violation of 
customary international law. loo 
Later, however, in July, 1988, the court granted plaintiffs' Mo-
tion to Reconsider the Order and reinstated Forti's claim for dis-
appearance. lOl After reviewing additional evidence submitted by the 
plaintiffs,102 the court concluded that the plaintiffs had met the 
burden of demonstrating international consensus as to the status 
and content of this proposed tort. 103 Therefore, "causing disap-
pearance" has become a valid cause of action under the Alien Tort 
Statute. 
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE JUSTICIABILITY OF ALIEN TORT CLAIMS 
As noted above, a consensus among federal courts holds that 
the Alien Tort Statute provides both jurisdiction to federal district 
courts and a private cause of action to an individual plaintiff. 104 
97 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1543. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1542-43. The court recognized that although causing disappearance of individ· 
uals by state officials is among the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law list of violations of 
international law, RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987), there is no prec· 
edent case declaring this proposed tort as a violation of the law of nations. Forti, 672 F. Supp. 
at 1542. 
100 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1543. 
101 Forti v. Suarez·Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988), modifying 672 F. Supp. 
1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The court also reviewed its decision regarding plaintiffs' claim of 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Id. The court did not reverse its prior holding 
with respect to that claim. Id. 
102 Plaintiffs priRcipally cited United Nations General Assembly Resolution 33/173 in 
order to show universal recognition of disappearance as a violation of the law of nations. 
Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 710. 
103 Id. at 711. The court determined that international accords characterized "causing 
disappearance" as: 1) abduction by state officials or their agents; followed by 2) official 
refusals to acknowledge the abduction or to disclose the detainee's fate. 694 F. Supp. at 711. 
The court concluded that Forti had established both of these elements. Id. 
104 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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This consensus does not imply, however, that every claim by an 
alien for a tort committed in violation of customary international 
law would proceed to trial in federal district court. Threshold lim-
itations such as the act of state doctrine, political question doctrine 
and statutes of limitations exist to ensure that the court acts within 
the contours of the Alien Tort Statute's jurisdictional grant. 105 These 
limitations allow a judge to abstain from hearing a case if she 
believes that it would exceed the bounds of judicial authority.106 
After finding Section 1350 jurisdiction and a private cause of action 
for acts of torture, prolonged arbitrary detention and summary 
execution, the Forti court addressed whether any threshold limita-
tions raised by the defendant should bar adjudication of the claims 
otherwise actionable under the Alien Tort Statute. 107 
A. The Act of State Doctrine 
General Suarez-Mason primarily advocated for application of 
the act of state doctrine. !Os This doctrine, based on respect for 
sovereign independence, urges American courts to abstain from 
inquiring into the validity of a foreign sovereign's acts even if those 
acts violate the sover.eign's territorial law, United States law or in-
ternational law. 109 General Suarez-Mason asserted that the chal-
lenged acts were committed pursuant to a state of siege which the 
constitutional government of Argentina had declared and the mil-
itary junta later reaffirmed. llo Thus, the defendant argued, Forti, 
which concerned state-sanctioned actions, commanded application 
of the act of state doctrine. lll 
A classic statement of the act of state doctrine appears in the 
late nineteenth century Supreme Court case of Underhill v. Hernan-
dez.ll2 There, the Court stated that 
105 Other such procedural limitations include the basic requirements that a defendant 
be subject to service of process and amenable to personal jurisdiction. See Memorandum of 
Professor Anthony D'Amato et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs at 23 n.14, Trajano 
v. Marcos, No. 86-0207 (D. Haw. 1986) [hereinafter Trajano Plaintiffs' Memorandum]; 
Randall, supra note 26, at 65-67. 
106 See V.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
107 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538. 
108 Id. at 1544. 
109 Case Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pefta-
Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 363 (1981). 
110 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1544. 
111 [d. 
112 168 V.S. 250 (1897). 
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[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of 
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will 
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another 
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason 
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be 
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 113 
Later, however, this doctrine was significantly reworked in several 
Supreme Court cases involving Cuba's expropriation of American 
property after the 1960 Cuban Revolution. ll4 
In the leading case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,115 the 
Supreme Court held that although Cuba's expropriation of Amer-
ican assets appeared to be a taking in violation of international law, 
the act of state doctrine barred adjudication of this taking. 116 These 
claims, the Court concluded, were nonjusticiable because no judicial 
standards existed by which to review cases involving foreign matters 
of this kind. ll7 The Court then designed a three-pronged test to 
aid courts in determining when to apply this doctrine. The test 
directs courts to balance the universality of an international legal 
principle, the effect of the matter on American foreign relations, 
and the foreign sovereign's world political status. llB After weighing 
these three factors and finding no clear international consensus but 
strong potential for adverse impact on U.S.-Cuba relations, the 
Court determined that the executive or legislature could better 
address the issue. 119 
In addition to expropriation cases, courts have consistently ap-
plied the act of state doctrine to actions against foreign heads of 
state. For example, in Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,120 the Aquino 
government of the Philippines pressed suit to recover funds which 
President Marcos and his wife allegedly embezzled from the country 
during the Marcos' reign. 121 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the act of 
state doctrine applied because the court could not adjudicate this 
case without addressing the legality of official government acts of 
113 [d. at 252. 
114 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First Nat'l 
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
115 376 U.S. 398. 
116 [d. at 398-99. 
117 [d. at 430-33. 
liB [d. 
119 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398-99. 
120 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987), withdrawn and reh'g en bane granted, 832 F.2d 1110 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (en banc). The Forti decision preceded the withdrawal of this case. 
121 [d. at 1480. 
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the foreign head of state, the latter being beyond the scope of 
judicial power. 122 
In Forti, General Suarez-Mason predicated his argument for 
the act of state doctrine on the Ninth Circuit Marcos case. 123 The 
Forti court held that Suarez-Mason erred in relying on the Ninth 
Circuit case because that case was clearly factually distinguishable. 124 
In Marcos, the claim was against a foreign head of state, not a 
subordinate government official as in Forti. Also, Marcos involved 
alleged violations of economic rights, not "fundamental human 
rights lying at the very heart of the individual's existence."125 Thus, 
the court concluded that the Marcos case did not control in this 
instance. 126 
Furthermore, the Forti court rejected the defendant's argument 
that allegations of official conduct under Section 1350 automatically 
require application of the act of state doctrine.127 Judge Jensen 
pointed out that most human rights violations can be linked to 
government activity. Thus, if the act of state doctrine were to apply 
to all official acts, it would prevent much of the litigation under 
Section 1350 for torts in violation of the law of nations. 128 For these 
reasons, the Forti court held that the act of state doctrine did not 
preclude adjudication of plaintiffs' claims under Section 1350. 129 
B. Untimely Claims and Indispensable Parties 
General Suarez-Mason also based his motion to dismiss on two 
other procedural limitations: an Argentine statute of limitations and 
122 Id. at 1482. Similarly, in Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986), the 
federal district court held that even if it had jurisdiction under § 1350, the act of state 
doctrine would require the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim that Marcos systematically 
suppressed free speech in the Philippines. Id. at 280. The court stated that it was beyond the 
judiciary's role to "subject the official acts or policies of the head of a foreign state to 
traditional standards of judicial review." Id. 
123 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1545. Civil defendants bear the burden of establishing appli-
cability of the act of state doctrine to bar adjudication of claims. Id. at 1546 n.9. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 1546. 
126 Id. at 1545. The court did not reach a legal analysis of the Sabbatino factors since 
Suarez-Mason failed to meet the threshold burden of a factual showing that an act of state 
had occurred. Id. at 1546 n.9. 
127 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1546. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1547. Judge jensen's treatment of the act of state doctrine in Forti is consistent 
with the general position held by the judiciary and international law academics. See, e.g., 
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 79, at 112; Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts 
of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the 
Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 246-47 (1983). 
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 19 relating to indispensable 
parties. 130 The court denied these portions of the defendant's mo-
tion because he was unable to establish the elements required under 
each. 131 
First, the defendant contended that an Argentine statute of 
limitations should apply, thereby rendering plaintiffs' claims un-
timely and nonjusticiable. 132 The court, however, disagreed. Not 
only did the court apply an American, rather than an Argentine 
statute of limitations,133 the court also specified a federal, not state 
statute of limitations because the plaintiffs' claim was a federal 
claim. 134 
Moreover, the court held that Forti merited application of a 
federal equitable tolling statute. 135 Equitable tolling arises under 
federal law when a defendant's wrongful actions or extraordinary 
circumstances beyond plaintiff's control prevent plaintiff from fil-
ing his claim on time. If a plaintiff can raise a genuine issue of 
material fact on either of these two points, federal equitable tolling 
tolls the limitation period until the barrier that prevented timely 
filing is removed. 136 Forti and Benchoam claimed that it was im-
possible for them to file a timely claim because General Suarez-
Mason had hidden himself in order to escape liability.137 The court 
found that the defendant's actions raised the issue of whether such 
actions substantially hindered the plaintiffs' efforts to file a timely 
claim, and thus, the federal equitable tolling statute applied. 138 
The court also dismissed the General's claim that the plaintiffs 
had failed to include his government superiors as parties in this 
130 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1538. 
131 /d. at 1552. 
132 [d. at 1547. 
133 [d. at 1548-49. After examining the equitable benefits and costs of applying a foreign 
state's statute of limitations, the court determined that justice and efficiency demand appli-
cation of the forum state's statute. [d. This position is consistent with the judicial policy of 
providing a wholly objective forum for claims of violations of internationally recognized 
human rights. [d. at 1548. 
134 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1549. Originally, the court ruled that the state statute of 
limitations for personal injury actions applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute. [d. at 
1548. This ruling followed a court finding that no specific statute of limitations exists under 
§ 1350 or international law. [d. at 1547. Nevertheless, even though a state limitations period 
governs a claim, federal equitable tolling doctrines, if invoked by a plaintiff as in Forti, 
supersede use of state law in a federal claim. [d. at 1549. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. at 1549-50. 
137 [d. 
138 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1550-51. 
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litigation. 139 The General argued that his superiors were necessary 
parties under FRCP 19(a) and (b).140 In support of his argument, 
the defendant relied on the case of Krug v. FOX,141 an action brought 
by the former operations manager of a coal mine against the United 
States Secretary of the Interior to restrain the latter from regulating 
the mine and exercising possessory rights over it. 142 In Krug, the 
Fourth Circuit found that the federal government, having legal 
possession of the mine, was a necessary party. The Krug court ruled 
that the government's presence was essential in order to protect its 
interest in the subject matter of the litigation. 143 General Suarez-
Mason asserted that the challenged conduct in the Forti action is 
similar to Krug because he carried it out in his capacity as a govern-
ment official and pursuant to orders from his superiors. 144 
The Forti court, however, distinguished Krug on the facts. 145 
The court concluded that Krug concerned a possessory interest that 
would have been impaired in the government's absence. By contrast, 
here, the General's superiors who allegedly commanded Suarez-
Mason to commit the challenged acts did not have such an interest 
in the subject matter of the litigation. 146 Without an acute interest, 
these government superiors were merely potential joint tortfeasors. 
The court then noted that joint tortfeasors are not necessary, but 
only permissive parties within the meaning of Rule 19. 147 Accord-
ingly, the court denied Suarez-Mason's motion to dismiss for failure 
to join indispensable parties. 148 
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING FUTURE ApPLICATION OF 
AND EXTENSION BEYOND Forti v. Suarez-Mason 
General Suarez-Mason raised only the act of state doctrine, a 
statute of limitations and a procedural rule regarding indispensable 
139 [d. at 1552. 
140 [d. A party is indispensable under Rule 19(a) if: "(1) in the person's absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the 
person's absence may ... impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest .... " 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
141 161 F.2d 1013 (4th Cir. 1947). 
142 [d. 
143 [d. at 1018. 
144 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1551. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 1551-52. 
147 [d. at 1552. 
148 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1552. 
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parties as defenses to adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims under 
the Alien Tort Statute. However, other means exist which could 
preclude or shape adjudication of such claims. Threshold limita-
tions such as the doctrine of sovereign immunity, embodied in the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the political question doc-
trine allow a court to refrain from hearing a Section 1350 case. 
When no theoretical limitations apply, members of the executive 
branch may intervene in a Section 1350 case and pressure a court 
into deferring to the executive's position. 
As the federal judiciary has grown more conservative over the 
past decade,149 the use of procedural limitations and judicial defer-
ence to executive intervention in Section 1350 cases has become 
more frequent. Judges who oppose Filartiga's broad interpretation 
of the Alien Tort Statute tend to employ these vehicles150 and thus, 
thwart the potential effectiveness of the Alien Tort Statute in Amer-
ican human rights litigation. Consequently, the use of these limita-
tions counteracts progress in the evolution of international human 
rights litigation in United States courts. 
A. Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity 
General Suarez-Mason could not raise the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity as a defense in Forti,151 but this doctrine is frequently 
applied in Section 1350 actions brought against foreign sovereigns. 
149 The current conservative political climate arguably began with the inauguration of 
former President, Ronald Reagan. Reagan has come to symbolize the politically conservative 
ideology that characterized the 1980s. Perhaps, the area in which this ideology best manifested 
itself is judicial appointments. During his presidency, Reagan appointed three Supreme Court 
Justices, 79 Circuit Court Judges and 265 District Court Judges-nearly 47 percent of the 
federal judiciary. Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, Nat'l L.j., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22, col. 
1. One report stated that "the President has been remarkably successful in finding candidates 
who share his view of the judiciary's role: so-called judicial restraint in interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution and statutes, deference to the actions of the other branches of government and 
strict enforcement of criminal laws." [d.; see also Williamson, Reagan Justice: A Conservative 
Legacy on the Appellate Courts, 10 AMERICAN LAWYER, June, 1988, at SI; Rice, 'Earl Warren 
Would Blush': On the President's Native Turf, There Has Been a Strong and Historic Shift From Left 
to Right, Legal Times, May 30, 1988, at 46, col. 1.; Wermiel, Tilting Bench: Reagan Choices 
Alter the Makeup and Views of the Federal Courts; Affirmative-Action Decisions Reflect Rightward 
Trend; Prison Terms Are Longer; An Agenda or Wise Restraint?, Wall Street j., Feb. 1, 1988, at 
1, col. 1. 
150 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
151 28 U.S.c. § 1603 (1982) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that, in 
order to raise the defense of sovereign immunity, a defendant must be an agent or instru-
mentality of a foreign state such as a political subdivision or a corporation owned by the 
foreign state. General Suarez-Mason did not fall within the statutory definition of "agent or 
instrumentality" and thus, could not raise this defense to adjudication. 
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Originally, the United States espoused the principle of absolute 
sovereign immunity which grants sovereign states immunity from 
all suits against them in American courts. Unconditional respect for 
the principle of sovereignty continued until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. Then, in the famous Tate letter of 1952,152 the State Depart-
ment urged the judiciary to adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity which was increasingly gaining support among other na-
tions. 153 Due to the increasing participation of governments in com-
mercial activities, judicial adherence to this new theory, which ex-
empts such activities from blanket protection of sovereignty, would 
allow persons transacting business with these nations to have their 
claims determined in an United States court. 154 
For this reason, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act (FSIA) in 1976. 155 The FSIA effectively denies sover-
eigns immunity from lawsuits arising out of their private, commer-
cial activities. 156 The FSIA still recognizes sovereign immunity as 
the norm, but significantly narrows the scope of its applicability.157 
Courts have generally viewed the exceptions enumerated in the 
FSIA as the exclusive means of abrogating sovereign immunity. 
Hence, in claims against sovereign nations for torts in violation of 
customary international law, U.S. courts have held that the sover-
eign is immune because these acts are non-commercial and thus, 
not within the FSIA exceptions. 15S In the mid-1980s, however, an 
argument emerged that there should not be immunity in those 
instances in which a sovereign state commits a violation of inter-
national human rights law. 159 
This argument is predicated on three bases. First, proponents 
of the theory conclude from a plain reading of the FSIA that Section 
152 Letter from the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the Department 
of Justice, May 19, 1952, reprinted in 26 United States Department of State Bulletin 984 
(1952) (The so-called "Tate letter" was a letter sent on behalf of the Secretary of the State 
Department, Jack B. Tate, to the acting Attorney General on May 19, 1952). 
153 Id. 
154 See generally id. 
155 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1 note, 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 
1602 et seq. (1976) [hereinafter FSIA]. 
156 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). 
157 /d. 
158 See, e.g., Sider man de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT, slip op. 
(C.D. Cal. 1984) vacated and dismissed, order (C.D. Cal. 1985) (The district court vacated its 
$2.6 million judgment and held that Argentina had a valid claim to sovereign immunity 
under the FSIA from suit for alleged torture and property deprivation). 
159 See Bazyler, Litigating the International Law of Human Rights: A "How To" Approach, 7 
WHITTIER L. REV. 713 (1985); Paust, supra note 129, at 233-42. 
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1604, in combination with Section 1330(a), exempts human rights 
violators from the norm of sovereign immunity by reference to 
relevant provisions of existing international agreements. 160 Second, 
after an examination of the legislative history behind the enactment 
of the FSIA, these scholars assert that the drafters purposely ex-
cluded an explicit exception to the norm of sovereign immunity for 
human rights violations. 161 Finally, supporters of this modern view 
contend that because the Alien Tort Statute162 and customary in-
ternational law163 both recognize sovereign states as potential hu-
man rights violators, it is clear that Congress intended courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns in claims of violations 
of international law falling outside of the FSIA provisions. 164 There-
fore, these scholars claim, United States courts that wish to follow 
the plain meaning of Section 1350 and evolving customary inter-
national law should no longer immunize sovereigns from suit for 
alien tort claims involving human rights abuses. 165 
This modern approach to the FSIA quickly gained acceptance. 
The Second Circuit relied upon it in the 1987 decision of Amerada 
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic. 166 This case involved an 
action brought under the Alien Tort Statute by the owner of a 
Liberian oil tanker for damages resulting from Argentina's bombing 
of his ship on the high seas during the Falklands War.167 The district 
court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the theory of 
sovereign immunity under the FSIA.168 On appeal, the Second 
Circuit, espousing the interpretation of the FSIA discussed above, 
160 Both § 1330(a) and § 1604 of the FSIA subject the general provision of sovereign 
immunity to existing and applicable international agreements. 28 U.S.C. § § 1330(a), 1604. 
The modern view proponents maintain that because the United States endorses the United 
Nations Charter, any provision thereof is an exception to the sovereign immunity rule. See 
Bazyler, supra note 159, at 732-34. Thus, Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, which 
address human rights and international enforcement of human rights, remove immunity 
privileges for human rights violators. See id.; U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56. 
161 Bazyler, supra note 159, at 733. Proponents of the modern view deduce that the 
drafters believed that customary international law and § 1604 of the FSIA adequately rec-
ognized this exception and that an additional expression of it in the FSIA would be redun-
dant. [d. 
162 Nowhere in its text does the Alien Tort Statute limit the class of defendants to private 
individuals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
16, See supra note 83. 
164 Bazyler, supra note 159, at 733-34. 
165 [d. 
166 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd 109 S. Ct. 
683 (1989). 
167 109 S. Ct. at 686-87. 
168 [d. at 687; 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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reversed and held that the FSIA did not preempt jurisdiction under 
the Alien Tort Statute. 169 
This decision was a significant victory for the "modern view" 
of sovereign immunity but was short-lived. In January, 1989, the 
Supreme Court, on writ of certiorari, overturned the lower court. 170 
The Court rejected the modern view on all three bases mentioned 
above and held that the FSIA precludes a finding of jurisdiction 
under the Alien Tort Statute in this instance. l7l Arguably, the mod-
ern view still has vitality if a plaintiff in a Section 1350 action against 
a foreign sovereign can point to international agreements that ex-
pressly provide for a private right of action. 172 Nevertheless, no 
plaintiff has been able to offer such an agreement in the past and 
it is reasonable to conclude that it will not be possible to do so in 
the future. Given this presumption, the Court's holding in Amerada 
Hess, in effect, limits the class of defendants in future cases under 
the Alien Tort Statute to individuals acting under color of state law. 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Amerada Hess 
actually pleased some human rights activists because the holding 
was quite narrow. 173 The Court did not address the construction or 
application of the Alien Tort Statute, even though these issues were 
arguably up for review. If the Court had directed its attention 
towards the current interpretation of Section 1350, many feared 
that the Rehnquist Court would gut the present force of Section 
1350, thereby undermining any progress in American human rights 
litigation. 174 Despite this perceived threat, the Court passed over 
the Filartiga interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. Nevertheless, 
169 Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. at 687. 
170 [d. at 692. 
171 [d. The Court found that the FSIA exception for international agreements, see supra 
note 160 and accompanying text, only applies when the international agreements relied upon 
by the plaintiffs expressly conflict with the FSIA's general provision of immunity. Such conflict 
can only arise if these agreements explicitly provide for private causes of action for recovery. 
Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. at 691-92. Furthermore, the Court found that Congress contem-
plated violations of international law when enacting the FSIA, clearly evidenced by the 
creation of an exception to immunity for takings in violation of international law in 
§ 1605(a)(3). Thus, the Court concluded that sovereign immunity exists for violations of 
international law which do not fall within one of the exceptions. [d. Finally, the Court held 
that because the First Congress, which adhered to the principle of absolute sovereign im-
munity, could not have contemplated sovereigns as defendants, and since no court had 
exercised jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the Alien Tort Statute prior to the 
FSIA, Congress had no reason to repeal § 1350 when it enacted the FSIA. [d. at 689. 
172 See supra note 171. 
173 See Moore, Suing the Dictator, 21 Nat'l J. Reports, Feb. 4, 1989, at 283. 
174 See id. 
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the Supreme Court's Amerada Hess decision demonstrates that the 
conflicting constructions of Section 1350 leave the legislation vul-
nerable to future legislative or judicial action. In the current polit-
ically conservative climate, such action is likely to contravene the 
progressive Filartiga reasoning. 
B. Political Question Doctrine 
In Forti, General Suarez-Mason espoused the argument of 
Judge Robb in Tel-Oren l75 and urged the court to refrain from 
adjudicating the case because of the political aspects surrounding 
the dispute. 176 Judge Jensen, however, summarily refused to apply 
the doctrine to the claims alleged by Forti and Benchoam. 177 
The political question doctrine is based on constitutional sep-
aration of powers principles and related prudential concerns. The 
doctrine essentially permits courts to abstain from hearing contro-
versial issues that involve constitutionally-delegated functions of the 
political branches. 178 The Supreme Court has continuously strug-
gled to formulate a precise standard regarding use of this doc-
trine. 179 The Court's most definitive statement appeared in the 1962 
case of Baker v. Carr: 180 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; 
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the poten-
tiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question. lSI 
Courts continue to rely on the standard of Baker v. Carr today. 
Despite articulation of a standard, the lack of agreement within the 
175 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
176 Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539. 
177 Id. 
17S See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96-107 (2d ed. 1988). 
179 See id. at 107. 
ISO 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
lSI Id.at217. 
1990] FORTI V. SUAREZ-MASON 347 
judiciary over the political question doctrine has not dissipated. In 
fact, the controversy is perhaps more pronounced than ever.182 
With respect to the Alien Tort Statute, the lack of clear stan-
dards for applying the political question doctrine presents an es-
pecially complex problem. Section 1350 cases, by their nature, typ-
ically involve sensitive matters of diplomacy and intergovernmental 
relations and thus ostensibly command automatic application of the 
political question doctrine. 183 Yet, as Justice Brennan stated in Baker 
v. Carr, "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which 
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."184 Courts 
facing Section 1350 claims thus have the heightened dilemma of 
determining whether the case presents a political question or is 
merely "politically-charged."185 These factually-oriented determi-
nations have resulted in inconsistent case law. 186 
Because of the nebulous standards of the political question 
doctrine, the judiciary is moving away from use of this doctrine. 
Courts now tend to hear cases that present possible political ques-
tions, but narrow the issues and restrict the holding to these narrow 
issues. 187 Judicial avoidance of the political question doctrine weak-
182 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.) (a mere plurality applied 
the political question doctrine to the issue of the President's power to abrogate a treaty). 
183 Cole, Challenging Covert War: The Politics of the Political Question Doctrine, 26 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 155, 156-57 (1985). 
184 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211. Later, in Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. American Cetacean 
Soc'y., 478 U.S. 221 (1986), the Court reasserted this position by holding that the judiciary 
has the authority to construe executive agreements and congressional legislation and cannot 
abstain from this duty merely because an issue has political overtones. Japan Whaling, 478 
U.S. at 228-29. 
185 Some legal scholars argue that a court must hear a valid § 1350 claim regardless of 
whether a political question exists because "a violation of international law is at stake." Paust, 
supra note 129, at 244; see also Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign 
Policy and Intemational Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1179 (1985). 
186 See, e.g., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (congressmen's 
assertions of deprivation of right to participate in decision to fund Nicaraguan contras, 
tantamount to waging war under war powers clause of Constitution, are non justiciable 
political questions); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (claims by 29 members 
of Congress of a right to decide issue of alleged military activity in EI Salvador under War 
Powers Act present nonjusticiable political questions), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). But 
see Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (claims by Honduran 
citizens that Secretary of Defense wrongfully used Honduran property for training facility 
for Salvadoran soldiers did not present non justiciable political questions). 
187 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (Supreme Court 
confined its decision "to the very questions necessary to the decision of the case," thereby 
avoiding application of the political question doctrine to dispute over President Reagan's 
compliance with an Executive Agreement between the U.S. and Iran); Ramirez de Arellano, 
724 F.2d at 147 (D.C. Circuit held that issue was narrow one of whether U.S. officials had 
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ens the force of this doctrine with respect to Section 1350 cases. 
Nevertheless, the political question doctrine remains a viable means 
by which a court may abstain from adjudicating an alien tort claim. 
Thus, especially in light of the growing conservatism within the 
judiciary, the doctrine remains a threat to the success of human 
rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. 
C. Executive Intervention and Judicial Deference 
Generally, the judicial branch is uneasy about deciding ques-
tions of international law because of its lack of expertise in inter-
national affairs. Hence, the judiciary frequently turns to the more 
internationally-experienced executive branch for guidance. 188 In 
response to a court's request for advice, the Department of State, 
usually through the Office of the United States Attorney General, 
submits a brief on the case in question. 189 Rather than merely using 
the brief as a suggestion on how to approach the case, however, 
courts tend to adopt the executive's position and echo it in their 
decisions. 190 
Ample evidence exists on the tendency of courts to defer to 
the executive on questions of international human rights law. For 
instance, in Filartiga, the State Department submitted a memoran-
dum to the Second Circuit which supported an exercise of jurisdic-
tion under Section 1350. 191 Consequently, the circuit court acted 
unlawfully deprived Honduran citizens of their land, not broader one of propriety of Amer-
ican military presence in Honduras). 
188 Judicial deference to the executive is similar to the political question doctrine in that 
it is based on the principle of separation of powers. Nevertheless, the two concepts are 
temporally distinguishable. The political question doctrine allows a court to abstain before 
reaching the merits of the case. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. Judicial deference 
to the executive does not occur until after the court reviews the material issues of the litigation. 
At that point, if the court finds that the executive's position provides necessary guidance, the 
court will defer to the executive branch. 
189 See generally Bazyler, supra note 159, at 736. 
190 Professor Bazyler remarked, "Case precedent indicates that if the executive enters 
on the side of human ~ights litigant, suggesting to the court that the case should be decided 
on its merits, the court will follow the executive's recommendation." Bazyler, supra note 159, 
at 736. Bazyler then states that a plaintiff's failure to establish a connection with the State 
Department "may lead to dismissal, regardless of the merits of the practitioner'S case." [d. at 
738. 
191 See Memorandum for the United States submitted to the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 
585, 597 (1980) [hereinafter Filartiga Government Memorandum]. In its Filartiga Govern-
ment Memorandum, the State Department laid out guidelines for the court to follow and 
then stated that "[ w ]hen these conditions have been satisfied, there is little danger that judicial 
enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts. To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a 
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upon this advice by reversing the district court's dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction. 192 
In Tel-Oren, the State Department also submitted an amicus 
brief, but there it discouraged the Supreme Court from hearing 
the case. 193 The government's brief warned that the issue of juris-
diction under Section 1350 was too premature to warrant Supreme 
Court review. 194 Moreover, the government argued that any result-
ing Supreme Court decision would not affect directly the Tel-Oren 
outcome because the D.C. Circuit had dismissed the case on several 
other grounds. 195 Accordingly, the Supreme Court denied the writ 
of certiorari. 196 
Most recently, in Amerada Hess, the Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the Second Circuit upon the advice of the State 
Department. 197 Arguing the separation of powers principle, the 
State Department cautioned that an affirmation of the circuit court's 
broad reading of the Alien Tort Statute with respect to the FSIA 
would have serious repercussions on international affairs. 198 In 
addition, an affirmation would transform the United States judi-
ciary into another international human rights court. 199 These 
private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our 
nation's commitment to the protection of human rights." [d. at 604. 
192 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876. 
19' United States Brief Submitted to Supreme Court in Response to Court's Invitation 
in Reviewing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (No. 83-2052), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 427 [hereinafter Tel-Oren Govern-
ment Brief]. 
194 [d. at 432. 
195 [d. at 434. The State Department concluded its brief for the Tel-Oren case by saying: 
"In these circumstances, we question whether this Court should exercise its discretionary 
jurisdiction to construe a statute as complex and little understood as the [Alien Tort Statute] 
in a context in which the outcome of the case is unlikely to be affected." [d. 
196 Tel-Oren, 470 U.S. 1003. 
197 Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. 683. 
198 The State Department asserted that the Second Circuit's holding in Amerada Hess "is 
inconsistent with the FSIA and international law, and it exposes the United States to reciprocal 
action by the courts of other Nations." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, at I, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 
(2d Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1372) [hereinafter Amerada Hess Government Brief]. 
199 The State Department asserted in the Amerada Hess Government Brief that: 
The decision below not only has the extraordinary effect of requiring petitioner 
[Argentina] to answer to the courts of a neutral third party regarding its conduct 
during a time of war. It also threatens to turn the courts of the United States into 
tribunals in which aliens generally (but not United States citizens) may seek redress 
against foreign governments for conduct that has no substantial nexus to the United 
States. 
Amerada Hess Government Brief at 29. 
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arguments prompted the Court to reverse the Second Circuit's 
decision.20o 
Some legal scholars believe that courts should refrain from 
deferring to the executive whenever a difficult international law 
question comes before them.201 These scholars reason that the Con-
stitution mandates insulation of the judiciary from executive inter-
vention in areas of statutory construction and federal jurisdiction, 
even when the question is international in nature.202 Nevertheless, 
as illustrated above, federal courts generally are increasingly un-
comfortable with judicial activism in Section 1350 cases. 
Perhaps judicial deference to the executive in these cases is 
simply due to respect for the separation of powers doctrine and the 
presumed expertise of the executive in foreign matters.203 Alter-
natively, it may be a manifestation of the political conservatism 
present in the federal court system today.204 Regardless of the rea-
son, the result is a shift within courts hearing Alien Tort Statute 
cases from activism to deference. The shift within the judiciary 
threatens to obviate adherence to and any broadening of the Filar-
tiga construction of Section 1350.205 Moreover, if the State Depart-
ment and Justice Department continue to sway the judiciary, the 
Alien Tort Statute will not be able to survive as a beacon for human 
rights litigation in United States courtS.206 
200 Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. 683. 
201 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
202 Amici for plaintiffs in Trajano state in their brief: "The opinions of persons in the 
Justice Department may change with the political winds, but questions of statutory construc-
tion, federal jurisdiction and international law should not." Trajano Plaintiff's Memorandum 
at 10. 
203 As Judge Bark cautioned in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: "A statute [Alien 
Tort Statute] whose original meaning is hidden from us and yet which, if its words are read 
incautiously with modern assumptions in mind, is capable of plunging our nation into foreign 
conflicts, ought to be approached by the judiciary with great circumspection." 726 F.2d 774, 
812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring). 
204 See supra note 149. 
205 Interestingly, the State Department has completely reversed its stance since Filartiga 
as to whether the Alien Tort Statute creates a private cause of action. In 1980, when the 
State Department submitted its Filartiga brief, it recognized that "an individual's fundamental 
human rights are in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic courts." Filartiga 
Government Memorandum, at 603. Most recently, however, the State Department asserted 
that the Alien Tort Statute is only jurisdictional in nature and does not create a cause of 
action. Amerada Hess Government Brief at 28 n.26. Without an express grant of a private 
cause of action, the State Department recognized that courts may attempt to imply a cause 
of action. [d. Yet, the State Department warned, "[s]uch an approach would present sensitive 
questions of foreign relations and the proper role of Article III courts .... " [d. 
206 Fortunately, no court yet has rejected the line of judicial reasoning regarding the 
interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute established by Filartiga. Nevertheless, courts may not 
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V. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS AFTER Forti v. Suarez-Mason 
A. Assessing the Forti Decision 
In the 1980 Filartiga decision, Judge Kaufman recognized the 
potential effect which the Second Circuit's decision would have on 
human rights litigation in the United States. He concluded his 
opinion in Filartiga by saying: "Our holding today, giving effect to 
a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a small 
but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free 
all people from brutal violence.''207 Many federal courts, including 
the Forti court, have adopted the progressive reasoning of Filartiga. 
Consequently, a consensus emerged which supports the exercise of 
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute in human rights cases. 
This consensus has met with considerable challenge from var-
ious levels of the federal judiciary. Judges, such as Judge Bork and 
Judge Robb in Tel-Oren, questioned the propriety of Judge Kauf-
man's interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute. These dissenters 
claimed that Judge Kaufman imposed modern principles of human 
rights on an outdated statute. Moreover, they believed that Judge 
Kaufman did not substantiate sufficiently his finding of a jurisdic-
tional grant, his inference of a cause of action and his standard for 
determining an international tort under Section 1350. Thus, the 
dissenters conclude, it is error for subsequent courts to follow the 
Filartiga decision. 
Despite these attacks on the Filartiga interpretation, courts gen-
erally continue to adhere to it. When assessing the conflicting in-
terpretations of Section 1350, courts have found Filartiga to be the 
stronger theory. In Forti, Judge Jensen aligned the district court 
with the Filartiga position for this very reason. He agreed with Judge 
Kaufman that courts should interpret the Alien Tort Statute in light 
of modern principles of international law. Accordingly, Judge Jen-
sen held that Section 1350 provides original jurisdiction and a pri-
vate cause of action for torts in violation of the law of nations. 
be able to avoid reviewing the statutory interpretation if they face continued pressure from 
the executive branch. A strong hypothesis is that if the judiciary falls prey to the conservative 
ideology of the executive branch, courts will read the Alien Tort Statute much more narrowly. 
It is foreseeable that only civil actions brought by aliens for specified, egregious human rights 
violations directly affecting the interests of the United States will meet the restricted standards 
of the Alien Tort Statute. See Kirgis, Alien Tort Claims, Sovereign Immunity and International 
Law in U.S. Courts, AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 330 (1988). 
207 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. 
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In order to support the Forti court's adoption of the Filartiga 
interpretation, Judge Jensen relied heavily on case law precedent. 
With respect to the jurisdictional grant, Judge Jensen pointed to a 
"growing consensus" within the federal judiciary. With respect to a 
private cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, Judge Jensen 
again looked to precedent. The existence of such precedent legiti-
mized the court's holding. 
After aligning the court with Filartiga, Judge Jensen expanded 
the scope of the Alien Tort Statute to include a private cause of 
action for the new claims of summary execution, prolonged arbi-
trary detention and "causing disappearance." Again, relying on 
precedent in addition to international legal agreements, Judge Jen-
sen found that these torts violated the law of nations and thus were 
actionable under Section 1350. Judge Jensen did not find such 
precedential support for the new claim of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Despite the existence of several international 
legal documents which recognized this claim as a violation of inter-
national law, the lack of precedent caused Judge Jensen to dismiss 
this alleged tort. 
Interestingly, Judge Jensen did not turn to precedent to sup-
port his rejection of several procedural limitations asserted by Gen-
eral Suarez-Mason. In fact, Judge Jensen refused to follow the cases 
raised by the defendant. With respect to each of the asserted limi-
tations-act of state doctrine, statute of limitations and the proce-
dural rule on dispensable parties-the Forti court distinguished the 
case law precedent supporting the General's position. The court 
did not allow any of these limitations to preclude adjudication of 
the case under the Alien Tort Statute. 
This inconsistent treatment of precedent in Forti raises two 
points. First, Judge Jensen knew that precedent was essential in a 
conservative era to support adequately his ruling on the statutory 
interpretation questions of Forti. He saw an opportunity for the 
court to follow the Filartiga interpretation and to expand upon it 
by including new international torts. To justify its decision, the court 
had to adhere strictly to precedent; where precedent was scant, the 
court did not venture into new areas. Second, Judge Jensen realized 
that his decision must withstand procedural attacks. Thus, the court 
broke down General Suarez-Mason's defenses. In order to do this, 
the court distinguished precedents on their facts and avoided a 
discussion of the merits of each precedent. The question arises 
whether a more detailed analysis of these cases would have pro-
duced a different result. Perhaps, the Forti court dismissed the 
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precedent supporting the General's defense too quickly in an effort 
to further the progressive reasoning of Filartiga. 
B. Conservatism within the Federal Judiciary 
The Forti court's avoidance of precedent with respect to pro-
cedural limitations is suspect in light of the rising conservatism 
within the judiciary. Conservative judges are finding that procedural 
limitations and deference to executive intervention are an attractive 
means of restricting the growth of a consensual interpretation of 
the Alien Tort Statute. Thus, when a court advances the progressive 
Filartiga interpretation, but dismisses procedural limitations without 
grounding its decision in precedent, it is inviting reversal by a less 
judicially active, higher court. To date, the judiciary has not ex-
ploited these opportunities to reverse the Filartiga interpretation. 
Nevertheless, if the conservative trend continues, conservative ju-
dicial activism may chip away at the scope of the Alien Tort Statute 
and the strength of the current consensus following Filartiga. 
C. Remedies Under the Alien Tort Statute 
The Forti case also revealed a serious flaw in remedying human 
rights abuses through the Alien Tort Statute: monetary sanctions 
are very difficult to enforce against powerful foreign defendants. 
Because the Alien Tort Statute is a jurisdictional grant over certain 
civil actions, the form of remedy is typically compensatory or pu-
nitive. In Forti, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their 
claims of torture, prolonged arbitrary detention without trial, sum-
mary execution and "causing disappearance." At the time of judg-
ment, the court did not make a determination as to damages. Before 
such a determination could occur, however, General Suarez-Mason 
hid most of his assets. Thus, the court could not locate anything to 
attach in satisfaction of the judgment. The plaintiffs in Forti were 
successful litigants but remained unrecompensed victims of abuse. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Forti v. Suarez-Mason will be a significant case for future human 
rights litigants in some respects. The Forti decision strengthened 
the consensus adopting the Filartiga interpretation of the Alien Tort 
Statute. Moreover, the Forti court expanded the scope of interna-
tional torts which fall within the Alien Tort Statute's jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the significance of Forti will be subject to certain lim-
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itations. Considering this era' of judicial conservatism, Forti sets a 
somewhat unstable precedent due to its quick dismissal of proce-
dural defenses. Thus, any subsequent federal district court case that 
factually distinguishes the case law precedent without discussing the 
merits of these cases may encounter difficulties on appeal. 
Furthermore, the Forti case demonstrates that enforcing judg-
ments in Alien Tort Statute cases may be virtually impossible. Thus, 
human rights litigants who rely on Forti and similar cases may not 
find a satisfactory remedy of their claims. Unfortunately, after Forti, 
the force of the Alien Tort Statute as a means of providing relief 
to human rights abuse victims has somewhat diminished. 208 
Allison J. Flom 
208 Although the significance of the Alien Tort Statute as a means of relief to human 
rights litigants is declining, other legislative efforts may assist such litigants. For example, on 
October 2, 1989, the House of Representatives has approved a bill entitled Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1989 which allows torture victims to sue their aggressors in U.S. courts 
regardless of their nationality. See H.R. 1662, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). If enacted, this 
act would further the progressive approach of Filartiga. See 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 1143, 
1144 (1989). 
